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Modelling in the Digital World – an Anti-Realist Perspective
Matthew J. Dovey
Oxford University,
65 St. Giles, Oxford, OX1 3LU, UK
matthew.dovey@las.ox.ac.uk
Abstract-This paper considers how we are constructing and
modelling digital realities, and considers the relationships
between digital realities and our reality using concepts from
traditional anti-realist philosophy.

About a year ago, I wrote a paper applying Berkeleian
idealism to the construction of Digital Realities [1]. By the
term “Digital Realities”, I refer to computer systems which
even if they do not go the extreme of virtual realities or
online communities still contain some sense of reality within
themselves; even a simple word-processor lives within its
own virtual reality of button bars, menus, virtual paper etc.
My original motivation for attempting to apply an 18th
century concept such as Berkeleian idealism [2] to a modern
construct was mainly pure curiosity (philosophy in the
strictest sense). However a number of surprising results
emerged from this analysis. The first was how useful even
outdated philosophical tools were in analysing modern
concepts in the computer world; the second was to highlight
the uneasy relationship between digital realities and our own
reality. In analogy with an observation of Wittgenstein:
"It is clear that logic may not conflict with its application. But
logic must have contact with its application. Therefore logic
and its application may not overlap one another." [6]
so it is with digital and “real” realities i.e. the world we
currently live in. They cannot overlap, although the sense of
one subsists within the sense of the other. In this sense,
although concepts in digital realities rely upon concepts in
reality for their existence, we cannot apply concepts from one
reality to the other. An irony is that these two conclusions are
mutually contradictory, although we need the first to derive
the latter. Again, an analogy with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is
applicable:
“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who
understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he
has claimed out through them, on them, over them (He must
so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on
it)” [6]
I touched on some of the implications of this on how we
view digital realities, and more importantly how we should
construct such realities. In this paper, I intend to investigate
those implications a little more deeply, but within a more
contemporary framework of antirealism. Initially to provide

some background, I will briefly rehearse some of the
arguments of my earlier paper. As in that paper, I will refer to
Digital Realities as DR, and our “real” reality as OR.
The basis of Berkeleian Idealism [2] is that esse is percipi,
namely, that we only ever perceive sense-data (ideas,
concepts) in the world. Berkeley took the position that all we
could ever be aware of in the world were sensations or ideas
– we do not perceive a chair we merely perceive a chair-like
sensation or a chair-like idea. He therefore postulated that out
perceptions of reality were merely interpretations of minds
interacting directly by exchanging ideas. In order for the
world to appear in its ordered form, or instance the continued
persistence of ideas such as our chair when an object is not
being perceived, Berkeley needed a supreme omnipresent
mind, namely God. Hence the anecdotal questions of whether
a tree makes a noise if it falls in a forest with no-one to hear
it, and the equally anecdotal answer that is does make a noise
since God being omnipresent hears it. In DR we have a
similar situation. In modern philosophy we have more
sophisticated anti-realist stances based upon similar
principles that what we perceive is either a veil of sense data,
which subsists, in a deeper reality which we cannot perceive
or else that there is nothing behind this veil. In science for
example this leads to a form of instrumentalism, which in its
simplistic form views scientific theories as merely explaining
our observations or the dials on our measuring instruments.
For example in the field of particle physics it would deny the
existence of electrons (or at least deny that we can ever prove
their existence which by Occam’s Razor, i.e. do not overelaborate if it is not necessary, is tantamount to the same
thing) and delegate them as “nice” fictions to explain the
traces in cloud-chambers amongst other observations.
Although at a metaphysical level DR can be considered in
an atomistic sense as being constructed from individual bits,
the perception of DR is determined by an interpretation of the
meaning of these bits. These bits are analogous to the monads
of Liebnitz [5] in that their meaning resided within their
relationships to each other. When we consider what
determines out perceptions of these bits, in it clear that our
perceptions of DR is shaped by other minds. What you
actually perceive as you traverse DR is a representation of the
bits produced by the programmers and engineers behind that
particular DR. In DR we therefore realise the Berkeleian
sense of minds interacting directly by exchanging ideas.
However within DR we no longer have the Berkeleian
supreme regulatory mind. The lack of a single adjudicator has
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the potential of making DR a far richer and inconsistent than
we would normally regard OR to be (the regulatory nature of
OR is, of course, a mute philosophical point which I will not
labour here).
Of course to complicate the matter further as we move into
the new “digital age” we are beginning to develop hybrid
concepts which encompass both DR and OR, especially as
constructs from DR such as e-Cash need to interact with and
have meaning within OR. However to understand the
implications of this Hybrid Reality we need to first
understand the relationship of its constituent components OR
and DR and how they interact. Only then will we begin to
understand this new world which we are currently creating.
In order to understand the relationship between OR and
DR, we need to embrace the concept of mysticism. In Eastern
philosophy, there is a super-reality (SR) within which the
truth of concepts in OR exist. The nature of this SR, by its
very definition is unknowable, and hence mysticism does not
greatly feature in the British tradition of philosophy; in the
words of Wittgenstein:
"There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the
mystical…whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be
silent" [6].
However, this mysticism is a very useful concept in this
case, as the relationship between OR and SR, is very similar
to the relationship between DR and OR; OR is the mystical
“super-reality” within which DR resides. Again to borrow for
Wittgenstein
“The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the
world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for
otherwise this would again be accidental.” [6]
The logic of OR is in fact a transcendental logic of DR, in
that we can build limits within the logics of a computer
system, so a “being” within that system would not be able to
comprehend logic available within DR which is beyond the
built in limits of its occupied system. However, the lack of a
regulatory mind as mentioned above implies that DR is
extremely rich in that the rules that govern the physics of its
reality is limited only by the imagination of its creator. Again
to quote Wittgenstein we have
"There is no causal nexus which justifies such an inference.
The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the
present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus" [6].
The anti-realist stance of my argument as regard our
perceptions of DR, is namely that we never perceive anything
in DR except through someone else’s interpretation: we are
always perceiving someone else’s logical construct; DR gives

us an arena in which we can convert ideas into “reality”.
However in order to understand how people react and work
within DR, which as computers and the internet become even
further embedded into common society, we need to
understand the uneasy “mystical” relationship between OR
and DR. The “unease” in this relationship is that although the
meaning of concepts within DR subsist within OR, there is no
necessary requirement for concepts within DR to have
analogues in OR. In general it is not a necessary fact that we
can use the intellectual framework derived from our
experiences in OR to comprehend DR. However, as can be
seen from the ease at which we can apply philosophical
concepts grounded in OR to DR, there does appear to be
some contingent and unnervingly close relationship between
concepts of both. For example, I have recently been working
with a number of projects looking at how traditional library
and archival practices map into their electronic counterparts.
In many cases, the practices inherent in the physical world
map almost directly to similar processes in the electronic
world with one significant proviso: there are differences in
degree but not in nature. For example, there is a lot of
concern about preservation of electronic information. It is
often regarded as different from physical information since it
can quickly become useless, even though the binary data can
still be read, for instance when the software required to read
the file format has become obsolete. This situation does,
however, occur in the physical world. We have very early
documents written in Linear-A, which we can no longer read.
The difference is in degree; it took generations for languages
to become obsolete, whereas software can become obsolete
within a single generation. Many other cases of differential
between physical and electronic analogues can be fitted into
this basic principle.
The degree part of this principle is fairly easy to explain.
Computers are continually increasing in power and speed.
Advances in networking and communications are increasing
the speed and ease by which computers communicate.
Commercial pressures too bare on the situation, whereby it is
important to improve the functionality of both hardware and
software in order to maintain a sellable commodity. The
result is that time passes very quickly in DR. This has a
number of unfortunate repercussions. The first is that
computer science is still a very young discipline, and in many
ways poorly understood. However, peoples perceptions
greatly exaggerate where we really stand with this
technology, with the result that there are many projects which
fail due to too much being promised in too short a time
frame. A more serious failing is the recognition of a
fundamental bottleneck in any useful computer system,
namely that of the human which participates in the DR being
constructed. Internet communications is an example of this.
The speed at which it is now possible to transmit e-mail,
often obscures the fact that the recipient still needs the same
amount of time to deal with the e-mail and respond to it as
with normal “snail-mail”. Instant transmission of e-mail does
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not imply instant response. Moreover the increase in degree
of the ease by which communications can be sent via e-mail
results in a typical recipient receiving far more
communications than was previously the case, hence the
speed at which e-mail can be dealt with, slows accordingly.
An increase in speed and accessibility has not increased our
ability to communicate. The problems being discussed in
preservation of electronic media have arisen because DR has
developed at rates beyond which the social infrastructures for
managing the information can cope. The computer industry
has been overly concerned with the technical bottlenecks, but
has paid little heed to the social ones.
As an aside it is interesting to note (as an example of the
contingent links between OR and DR) that one method the
industry has used to overcome technical bottlenecks, namely
the parallel execution of conditional branches is analogous to
the quantum physics wave function; in modern CPU’s the
outcome of both branches of a conditional are calculated
simultaneously before the conditional is calculated, the false
branch being abandoned when the conditional is calculated:
in quantum physics the wave function holds all possible
outcomes, the false ones being “abandoned” (i.e. the wave
function collapsed to a single value) when an observation
takes place.
The second part of our contingent principle that DR differs
from OR in degree rather than nature can be analysed in
terms of the Berkeleian Idealism expressed above. We can
regard our interactions with DR as an exchange of ideas
between minds, that of the observer or participant in DR, and
that of the designers and programmers behind that particular
aspect of DR. Both these have a role to play in the particular
perception of DR: the programmer in that we can only ever
perceive someone else’s interpretation of the fundamental
bits that ultimately constitute DR; and of course the ultimate
observer will always place their own spin on what is being
observed. I will consider the latter first, as ironically, as will
become apparent, this also shapes the interpretations that the
designers of DR try to project. Typically we interpret DR
using the same inductive framework that we use for
interpreting OR. We interpret our perceptions in both OR and
DR, based on our past experiences. As Hume writes

within DR. However these models are often extremely
effective, proviso the principle mentioned above of
differences in degree rather than nature. One explanation for
this is that we are using models grounded in OR to construct
DR, and I will cover this shortly. However, I do not consider
it too surprising that we can construct effective models of DR
in OR, without implying that DR and OR necessarily share
concepts by considering anti-realist views of how we build
mathematical models in the sciences. Essentially we perceive
patterns in OR where none necessarily exist:
“Objects have no discoverable connection together; nor is it
from any other principle but custom operating upon the
imagination, that we can draw any inference from the
appearance of one to the existence of another” [4]
This is similar to Wittgenstein’s observation on the lack of
a causal nexus quoted above. The instrumentalist stance to
science claims that we construct models of the universe in
physics, we are not really describing the universe, but instead
creating mathematical fictions, which have certain predictive
properties, which match the currently observed phenomenon.
Entities such as electrons, which cannot be directly observed,
do not have any “real” existence but are just convenient
constructs in our model. This stance explains way the
universe appears to be mathematical. In fact it is not, but
since mathematics is a language for describing patterns and
relationships, in readily lends itself to building these fictional
models. The same can be applied to our perceptional models
of DR. The mental framework we have constructed to
interpret these fictional patterns in OR, is by its nature suited
to interpreting fictional patterns in DR. As in the physical
sciences, we need to be always ready to refine or even reject
our existing perceptual models given new evidence. This is
particularly pertinent to our models of DR, since DR can
differ in often quite subtle ways from our expectations of OR.
For example, in user interface design, there is often a
tendency to mimic physical objects. This can cause confusion
since the analogy can only go so far, and there will always be
some difference between the replica in DR and the real
version in OR.

“the mind is convinced by reasoning of the principle that
instances of which we have no experience, must necessarily
resemble those of which we have” [4]

The other reason for the contingent similarity between OR
and DR, as touched on above, is based on the way in which
we construct entities in DR. Most of the time we build
constructs in DR which mirror OR; there are two possible
explanations for this:

Typically our past experiences will be solely or primarily
based in OR, and hence we superimpose our understanding of
the principles of OR onto DR. Viewed under this light it is
not surprising that younger generations who have been
brought up with computers find DR easier to deal with since
their past experiences intrinsically include experiences of DR
from a formative age. In effect we are building models
grounded in OR to explain out experiences and interactions

The first is an assumption that for various reasons it is
better to limit our constructions in DR to those that mirror
similar constructs in OR, either because people find it easier
to work in DR when the constructs and principles are familiar
to them from OR, and the other is that the processes we have
developed in OR are effective in DR. The fact that we
interpret constructs in DR along OR lines tend to support
these reasons, however I would claim that neither of these
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reasons are necessary truths. Whilst it is true that familiarity
reduces the learning curve, it is not necessarily the case that a
system, which involves a shallow learning curve, is the most
effective. There are many software packages that have a very
complicated interface, but are more efficient when used by a
competent user, than a similar package with a simpler
interface when also used by a competent user. Whilst I would
not propose abandoning principles of good user interface
design, I would argue that we should not be limited to OR
concepts when designing such things. Ultimately people have
to learn to cope with extremely complex ideas in OR, and the
same should be applicable to DR. Making DR overly familiar
gives a false sense of security which often undermines the
goal of making users more comfortable with DR when the
differences become apparent. The above argument is based
on purely philosophical reasoning but empirically it is also
supported by evidence within the Information Science
community on the problems associated with metaphor and
logical analogues in interface design. Anne Hamilton [3]
gives a good summary of this material.
The second reason springs from how we build computer
systems which perform some task previously performed
solely within OR. Often it is the case that the process in OR is
modelled within DR without any major modifications to the
process itself. This stems partly from the perceived need to
maintain familiarity (this has strong social reasons, as a
totally alien process would probably be rejected by the
existing users of the process, although this rejection may not
be made on particularly strong grounds) and partly the
perception that all that modelling the process in DR can offer
is enhanced speed or changes in degree rather than nature. If
DR can really offer nothing more that changes in degree, then
it is sound that a process, which has been developed and
refined over some, time in OR, should be transferred with
little modification into DR. However, it is likely that an
entirely different process may be more effective in DR, but
which either would not be so effective or possibly not even
realisable in OR. The problem here is how to think in purely
DR terms without letting our pre-conceptions of OR interfere.
This is where the second reason for our constructs in DR to
follow OR concepts, and this follows on from Hume’s
concepts behind the nature of ideas:
“That all out simple ideas in their first appearance are derived
from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them,
and which they exactly represent” [4]
and complex ideas are derived by combining these simple
ideas. Since interaction of DR is essentially a direct
interaction of minds and exchange of ideas, we are only
limited by our imagination as to what we can construct within
DR. However, if the philosophy of ideas are expounded by
Hume is correct the only ideas that we can exchange within
DR are ideas which are ultimately derived from our

experiences in OR. Whilst in theory DR is not limited by the
concepts or logics from OR, in practice since DR is a manmade reality and can never be more than what we make it,
DR is circumscribed by experiences and logics of OR: it can
never realise its potential unless we break out of the mental
frameworks imposed upon us by our experience of OR.
Ironically, there is a circularity here, in that DR if it realised
its full potential could provide a reality it which we can break
out of these bonds, but in order for use to realise such a
potential DR we already need to have broken out of these
bonds. Whether DR will ever realise its potential therefore
revolves on whether all ideas must derive from experience.
Currently DR seems to support the Humean view of ideas,
but this may be because of current practice rather than a
necessary fact.
To conclude, DR has the potential to far surpass the
restrictions of our concepts of OR. However there seems to
be a contingent truth that whilst DR is alien when compared
to OR, it in fact in most cases only differs in OR by factors of
degree rather than factors of nature. This may be due to
current practices which perpetuate this myth believing that
DR can only differ in degree and offer little more that OR in
terms of nature or which feel we need to ground concepts of
DR in OR in order for DR to be comprehensible. However, it
may be the case that this contingent resemblance between DR
and OR is more deeply rooted in how we build our perceptual
models of the universe.
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